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GORDON V.N.C. DEP'T OF CORR.,
618 S.E.2d 280 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)

FACTS
The North Carolina Department of Correction (DOC) announced a
job opening for the position of Superintendent IV at the Pamlico Correctional
Institution on July 17, 2001.1 Joseph Lofton, Eastern Region Director of the
DOC, was the hiring manager and reviewed seven individuals for the
position, including Robert Hines and Petitioner Gwendolyn L. Gordon.2
Gordon, a white female, had over twenty years experience within the DOC.
Her work was primarily in programming areas, but her experience also
encompassed inmate relations and accommodations, as well as other areas of
expertise.3 She also had a four-year business administration degree, was
certified as a Basic Correctional Officer, and had five years and eight months
experience as an Assistant Superintendent.4 Hines, an African-American
male, also had served over twenty years with the DOC, but his experience
focused on operations and inmate custody.5 He held a two-year associate
degree with additional credit hours in business administration and served as
an assistant superintendent for nine years and nine months. After reviewing
and interviewing the job applicants, Lofton and the hiring committee
recommended Hines for the position, and DOC Secretary Theodis Beck
subsequently promoted Hines on September 13, 2001.'
Gordon filed a petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings
(OAH) on January 18, 2002 contesting the decision to promote Hines and
claiming that she was not promoted because of race and gender
discrimination.8 After an administrative hearing, the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) found that the DOC did discriminate against Gordon based on
both her race and gender and ordered that, until she received a promotion
similar to Hines's, Gordon receive back pay and benefits from the date of
Hines's promotion. 9
The State Personnel Commission (Commission) received the ALs
decision and the corresponding record on February 11, 2003 and
subsequently reversed it.' 0 Gordon sought review of the Commission's
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reversal and also requested sanctions against the DOC in the Pitt County
Superior Court." Five days later, the Commission withdrew its decision,
stating that it did not have the complete record from the AU hearing.' 2 The
Commission later reversed the AL's decision for a second time.' 3 Gordon
again petitioned the Superior Court for judicial review and filed for sanctions
against the DOC. 4 She also requested that the Superior Court adopt the
ALJ's order since the Commission's second order on the basis that it was
issued outside of its allotted decision-making period.15
After a hearing on Gordon's motions, the Pitt County Superior Court
issued an order reversing the Commission's second decision because it was
both untimely and in error. 16 In addition, the trial court fully adopted the
ALJ's decision
and order, awarding Gordon damages. 17 The DOC then filed
8
appeal.'
this
HOLDING
Writing for the North Carolina Court of Appeals, Judge Tyson fully
affirmed the decision of the Pitt County Superior Court,' 9 and Judges
McCullough and Bryant concurred without filing separate opinions. 20 The
court found that because the Commission had neither authority nor good
cause to issue a late decision, the trial court did not err in reversing the
Commission's decision as untimely. 2' In addition, the court ruled that trial
court did not err in adopting the ALJ's finding that the DOC discriminated
against Gordon based on both her race and gender.22
ANALYSIS

After de novo review, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
considered and rejected the DOC's claim that the trial court erred in finding
the Commission's order void due to untimeliness. 23 North Carolina law
mandates that unless an agency makes a final decision within sixty days of
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receiving the official record, the Al's decision becomes the final decision
of the agency.24 The statute enables the agency to extend this time period by
sixty days if the agency and the other parties agree to an extension or if the
agency shows good cause.25 The court of appeals ruled that the trial court
was correct in its finding that the Commission had, in effect, adopted the
ALJ's findings and decision because it had not made a showing of good
cause nor had it reached an agreement to extend its time for consideration.26
The Commission received the official record from the ALJ hearing.27
The record contained a certification stating that the information included
comprised the official record of the hearing; however, the certification also
indicated that Lofton's deposition was on video tape but was not included
although it was available for review in the OAH Clerk's office. 28 The Chief
Clerk of the OAH issued a sworn affidavit stating that no one from the
Commission contacted the clerk's office to view the tape. 29 The Commission
reversed the AU's ruling.30 After Gordon petitioned for judicial review, the
Commission withdrew this decision, claiming that they had an incomplete
record; they later received the "complete" record and issued a second
31
decision, again reversing the AU, 112 days after its receipt of the record.
The Commission claimed that its final decision was untimely because the
OAH initially sent an incomplete record, qualifying as good cause for an
extension under the North Carolina statute.32
The court of appeals rejected this claim, citing precedent that the
North Carolina "statute is clear that if a final decision has not been made
within [the sixty-day time limit] the agency is considered to have adopted the
ALJ's recommended decision. [There is] no ambiguity in this statutory
language. 33 Because the record did not indicate that the parties had agreed
to a time extension, the only way in which the second decision could be valid
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See N.C. GEN STAT. § 150B-44 (2003) (finding "An agency... has 60 days from the day it

receives the official record in a contested case... or 60 days after its next regularly scheduled meeting,
whichever is longer, to make a final decision in the case... If an agency has not made a final decision
within these time limits, the agency is considered to have adopted the administrative law judge's decision
as the agency's final decision.").
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Gordon, 618 S.E.2d at 286 (citing N.C. GEN STAT. § 150B-44 (2003)).
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Id. at 286-87 (citing N.C. GEN STAT. § 150B-44 (2003); Holland Group v. N.C. Dep't of
Admin., 504 S.E.2d 300, 305 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Occaneechi Band of the Saponi Nation v. N.C.
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despite its untimeliness was via a showing of good cause.34 The court found
that the Commission in this case was attempting to "disavow" its prior
statement that it had received the whole record when it issued its initial
decision and that this disavowing was improper, as previously established in
3 5 Because
Holland Group v. North CarolinaDepartment of Administration.
the first decision clearly states that the Commission received the official
record and because the Commission was on notice that the videotapes were
available for review, the court declared that no good cause had been
established to extend the Commission's time for issuing its decision.36 In
addition, the court noted that the Commission's first decision issued without
review of the videotapes, and the second decision based on review of the
37
entire record including the videotapes, were "virtually identical."
Therefore, the appeals court ruled that the trial court was correct in adopting
the AL's finding of fact, conclusions of law, and final decision.38
The court of appeals next addressed and then rejected the DOC's
claim that, in adopting the AM's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
trial court erred in its finding that the DOC had engaged in racial and gender
discrimination against Gordon. 39 The court first addressed the law-based
findings that the trial court adopted from the AL's decision. 40 The DOC
alleged that the trial court incorrectly concluded as a matter of law that
Gordon had established a prima facie case of race and gender
discrimination.41 The court addressed this claim utilizing the de novo
standard of review.42
34
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Id.; see Holland, 504 S.E.2d at 304 (finding that the trial court correctly adopted the AL's
decision because the Department of Administration (DA) had issued its decision beyond the statutory time
limit). In Holland, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court decision adopting the
decision of an Administrative Law Judge because the DA's decision was untimely. Id. at 302. There, the
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later attempted to extend its time in reviewing the record because certain tape recordings were not
included in the official record and finally issued its final decision over nine months after its initial
designation of its receipt of the official record. Id. at 302-03. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court decision finding that the DA's decision was untimely. Id. The court reasoned that the time period
was designed to protect against unreasonable delay and that the DA gave its official assurance to the
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The North Carolina Supreme Court has noted that, in adopting the
43
United States Supreme Court's standard for proving a discrimination claim,
"a primafacie case of discrimination 'may be established in various ways"'
in satisfying the first prong of the Supreme Court's test.44 The court noted
that the DOC ignored the North Carolina Supreme Court's open-ended
allowance for the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination and
instead claimed that since Gordon had not fulfilled a four-part test
enumerated by the state Supreme Court, 5 the trial court erred in finding as a
matter of law that Gordon had established a primafacie case. 46 In reviewing
the facts, the court of appeals found that Gordon established those four
elements in her gender discrimination claim but that she did not meet the
four part test in her race discrimination claim.47 However, she was also able
to establish a prima facie case in her race discrimination claim using the
open-ended standard because the evidence demonstrated the following:
Gordon was better qualified than Hines; her experience was tailored to the
DOC's previou8 hires for the position; errors detrimental to her were
committed in the hiring process; Lofton's own evaluations objectively
indicated that she was the better applicant; and an email from DOC Secretary
Beck to Lofton tended to show that an African-American male was going to
be hired regardless of applicant qualifications.48 Because Gordon's proffered
evidence demonstrates a primafacie case of discrimination based on both the
four-part test and the more open-ended general standard and because
substantial evidence supports the claim of a prima facie case, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the DOC's claim of error in the trial
court's legal conclusions
regarding the prima facie case of gender and racial
49
discrimination.
After finding that the trial court correctly adopted the AL's lawbased findings regarding Gordon's discrimination claims, the court of
43
Id. at 287-88 (citing Dep't of Correction v. Gibson, 301 S.E.2d 79, 82 (N.C. 1983) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) "(1) The claimant carries the initial burden of
establishing a primafacie case of discrimination; (2) The burden shifts to the employer to articulate some
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the applicant's rejection; and (3) If a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for rejection has been articulated, the claimant has the opportunity to show that the stated reason
for rejection was, in fact, a pretext for discrimination.").
Id. at 288 (citing Gibson, 301 S.E.2d at 82-83).
45 Id. at 288-89 (citing Gibson, 301 S.E.2d at 83) ("For example, a prima facie case of
discrimination may be made out by showing that (1) a claimant is a member of a minority group, (2) he
was qualified for the position, (3) he was discharged, and (4) the employer replaced him with a person
who was not a member of a minority group").
46 Id.
47 Id. at 288 "(1) as a female, she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified for a
promotion; (3) she was passed over for the promotion; and (4) the person receiving the promotion was not
a member of the protected class". Id.
4
Id.
49 Id. at 289.
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appeals addressed the fact-based findings supporting Gordon's claim and the
AU and trial court's decision. 50 The DOC claimed that the trial court's
decision was in error because it was based in part on incorrect findings of
fact regarding the content of Secretary Beck's email, Lofton and Hines's
conflicting testimony, and DOC witness testimony analyzing Gordon's prior
experience. 5 ' In reviewing this claim, the appeals court noted that it must
adhere to the substantial evidence standard,5 2 allowing it to determine if there
is "relevant evident evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. ' ,53 The court of appeals reviewed the AL's findings of
fact adopted by the trial court and found that they were all supported by
substantial evidence.54
Regarding the email that Secretary Beck sent to Lofton, the AU
found that the content of the email indicated that the DOC was going to hire
an African-American male rather than hiring a white female regardless of the
qualifications of the applicants, supporting Gordon's allegations of
discrimination. 55 Because the ALl based this finding *Partially on his
disbelief of Beck's in-court explanation of the content of the email in a nondiscriminatory context, the appeals court followed precedent and did not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the AU because, as the trier of
fact, the AU was present for the parties' testimony and was able to observe
the parties' demeanors and other indicators of truthfulness.56
The court of appeals also noted that the AU's finding of fact
regarding Lofton and Hines's conflicting testimony was supported in the
record by substantial evidence.57 Lofton testified that he had no personal
interactions with Hines and only one professional interaction with him in a
supervisory capacity.5 8 In contrast, Hines testified that he once worked at a
small correctional facility with Lofton, that there they sometimes worked the
same two- to three-officer shifts, that they lived in the same town, that they
were members of some of the same professional organizations, and that they
both attended social functions held by these organizations. 59 The court of
appeals noted that this evidence of discrepancy in the testimony was enough
satisfy the substantial evidence standard. 60
50
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N.C. GEN STAT. § 150B-2(8b) (2003).
Gordon, 618 S.E.2d at 290-91.

Id. at 290.
Id. at 291 (citing Carroll,599 S.E.2d at 896 and Watkins v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs,
593 S.E.2d 764, 769 (N.C. 2004)).
57
Id. at 290.
55

58
59

Id.
Id.

60

Id.

GORDON V. N. C. DEP'T OF CORR.

Finally, the court found that the administrative hearing record
supported the finding of fact that witnesses for the DOC were critical of
Gordon's work history, thus satisfying the substantial evidence standard.6'
The court noted that the witnesses' undervaluation of Gordon's prior
experience and their notation of her failure to take certain assignments or
diversify her geographic location indicated that they were critical of her work
experience and qualified as substantial evidence supporting the AL's
finding of fact.62
The court's final inquiry regarding Gordon's claim of race and
gender discrimination involves the DOC's allegation that the ALJ and trial
court erred in their finding of fact and conclusion of law determining that
Gordon was more qualified than Hines for the position in contest.63 The
DOC alleged that the ALT and the trial court had impermissibly substituted
their own judgment for that of the employer as to which candidate best
satisfied the needs of the position. 64 However, the court of appeals noted that
the fact-finder noed only discern the employer's motivations in making the
contested decision and that to conclude that discrimination is present, the
fact-finder must only give credit to the plaintiffs explanation of the decision
and disbelieve the employer's alleged non-discriminatory reasoning.65 The
court then addressed the AL's finding of fact concluding that Gordon was
more qualified than Hines.66 In reviewing the record and the evidence
presented at the hearing, the court found that substantial evidence supported
the finding of fact and that Gordon had met the burden of showing
intentional discrimination, noting that Gordon had more education, a more
senior status, higher interviewing and testing scores, and better reviews by
the DOC itself.67 Therefore, the court of appeals denied the DOC's claim of
error in the ALT and trial court's finding of facts regarding Gordon's
qualifications.68
The court also addressed the DOC's claim that the ALJ and trial
69
court's conclusions of law regarding Gordon's qualifications were in error.
After reviewing the specific qualifications that the DOC requested from
candidates for the position, 70 analyzing Gordon and Hines's backgrounds,
62
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Id.
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Id. (citing Gibson, 301 S.E.2d at 84).
Id. (citing Enoch v. Alamance County, 595 S.E.2d 744, 752 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 511 (1993)).
66
Id.
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Id. at 292 (citing Dorsey v. UNC-Wilmington, 468 S.E.2d 557, 560 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)).
64
65

12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. Soc. JUST. 2 (2006)
reviewing the AU and trial court's findings, and consulting relevant
precedent, the appeals court found that the conclusion of law that Gordon
was better qualified was supported by substantial evidence and that this
finding was objectively legitimate.7 ' Since substantial evidence supports the
finding of fact and the legal conclusion that Gordon was better qualified, the
court of appeals found that the ALJ and trial court's recognition of Gordon's
claim of race and gender discrimination was valid.72
The North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that each of the
DOC's claims of error was without merit, finding that the Commission's
delay in entering its decision effectively adopted the ALJ's decision and that
the AL' s findings of fact and legal conclusions were valid and supported
Gordon's claims of both racial and gender discrimination.7 3 Therefore, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's adoption of the AL' s decision and
order in its entirety. 74
CONCLUSION
While Gordon does not have far-reaching implications for
employment discrimination law, it implicates an important principle
significant to plaintiffs alleging discrimination by their employers and
illustrates the complicated nature of North Carolina's discrimination law
scheme. First, the appeals court's analysis illustrates the wide deference
afforded to the decisions of administrative law judges. When analyzed under
the substantial evidence standard as in this case, affirmation of the
administrative decision is likely; therefore, Gordon demonstrates the
importance of the employment discrimination claim at the administrative
level. In addition to the deference shown to the rulings of the administrative
court, the court's analysis in Gordon implicates the complications arising
from North Carolina's open-ended allowance for a showing of a primafacie
case of discrimination to plaintiffs. Although North Carolina courts do not
mandate a strict set of elements to be fulfilled in order to establish a prima
facie case and therefore enable a broader range of plaintiffs to file
meritorious claims that would otherwise fail to meet the elements of a
specific test, plaintiffs' burdens of production at different stages of the claim
are muddled absent the structure traditionally present in discrimination law
schemes. Facts typically used to demonstrate that an employer's nondiscriminatory reasons for the hiring decision was a pretext for

72
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discrimination are utilized to establish a prima facie case and for their
conventional use, thereby complicating the court's analysis.
Gordon illustrates the deference shown to decisions made by
administrative law judges in the fact-finding stage of administrative law
hearings. In this case, while North Carolina law requires de novo review of
challenges to the ALJ opinion regarding questions of law, all of the issues of
fact supporting these questions of law are evaluated by both the trial court
and appeals court using the "substantial evidence" standard of review. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals articulates this standard as requiring
findings of fact to be based upon "relevant evidence a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 7' 5 This is a very low standard of
review, virtually enabling ALJ findings of fact to stand unchallenged absent
a completely erroneous ruling. Here, this deferential standard permitted the
verdict for Gordon at the administrative level to stand despite a strong
challenge from the Department of Corrections. The substantial evidence
standard used to review administrative findings of fact in North Carolina
highlights the importance of the administrative hearing.
North Carolina's open-ended method of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination enables plaintiffs to file meritorious claims of
discrimination that do not meet the strict elements of a traditional primafacie
case. However, the absence of structure in forming a prima facie case
enables plaintiffs and courts to use the same reasoning at multiple stages of
the discrimination inquiry, muddling the court's analysis of discrimination
claims. In Gordon, the DOC attempts to dispose of Gordon's claims by
stating that since she does not meet the four-part standard for a prima facie
case of discrimination articulated by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
North CarolinaDepartmentof Correction v. Gibson.76 However, in Gibson,
the North Carolina Supreme Court explicitly states that "[t]he burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is not onerous" and that "it
may be established in various ways," including the four-part test mentioned
by the court.77 That standard for establishing a prima facie case requires a
N.C. GEN STAT. § 150B-2(8b) (2003).
See Gibson, 301 S.E.2d 82-83 (listing a four-part showing for a prima facie case of
discrimination). In Gibson, plaintiff, an African-American correctional officer, was fired after an incident
in which he incorrectly carried out his duties. id. at 85. However, several other white employees were
also involved in the incident and were not fired. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court articulated North
Carolina law regarding the standards for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and found that
Gibson had established such a case in his claim regarding his termination. Id. at 82-83, 85. That court
also found that although the State Personnel Commission articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for Gibson's termination, it articulated an improper burden of proof in showing this
nondiscriminatory reason. Id. at 88. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the appeals and trial court
decisions and remanded to the State Personnel Commission to re-hear the case using the correct burden of
proof. Id.
77 Id. at 82 (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
75
76

12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. SOC. JUST. 2 (2006)
showing that: "(1) a claimant is a member of a minority group, (2) he was
qualified for the position, (3) he was discharged, and (4) the employer
'7 8
replaced him with a person who was not a member of a minority group."
The test articulated by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Gibson would
preclude Gordon's claim of racial discrimination. However, because North
Carolina law allows for plaintiffs to establish prima facie cases without
complying with constricting standards and elements, employees like Gordon
are able to hold employers accountable for discriminatory decisions that are
novel claims and that do not explicitly violate established case law.
Although this open-ended method of establishing a primafacie case
does allow for plaintiffs to bring claims arising outside the traditional context
of employment discrimination, North Carolina's employment discrimination
law structure intensifies the confusion in an already-complicated area of law.
Because plaintiffs are able to use any reason or evidence to construct a prima
facie case of employment discrimination, evidence used at one stage of the
inquiry is likely to be used at other stages of the analysis, thereby causing
difficulties and overlap in the court's analysis. North Carolina has adopted
the three-step federal standard for proving an employment discrimination
claim: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination,
(2) the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory
reason for the alleged discriminatory activity, and (3) the plaintiff must show
that the employer's articulated non-discriminatory reason was a pretext for
discrimination.79
In a structured scheme, in the first step, courts have articulated
specific methods through which plaintiffs can prove a prima facie case.
Then in the third step, the plaintiff has free range and discretion to present
evidence demonstrating why the employer has in fact discriminated despite
allegations otherwise. In the North Carolina scheme, as illustrated in
Gordon, a wide range of evidence can now be presented to prove the prima
facie case in step one, evidence that would conventionally be used in the
third step. Instead of presenting straight-forward facts in establishing the
primafacie case, such as the plaintiff's membership in a protected class and
the plaintiff's termination and replacement with a non-minority employee,
North Carolina law allows the presentation of a broad range of evidence at
step one, evidence that can and will likely be used again to rebut the
employer's non-discriminatory reasoning in step three. Although this does
not in any way reflect on the merit or validity of any plaintiff s claim, it does

78
Id. at 82-83 (citing Coleman v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 664 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1982) and
Marks v. Prattco, Inc., 607 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1979)).
79
Id. at 82 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
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complicate the jobs of judges and makes analysis of North Carolina
employment law more confusing.
Gordon demonstrates the broad range of fact patterns that may
initially establish a case of employment discrimination under North Carolina
law and the deference that reviewing courts show to findings of fact at the
administrative level. These two factors both implicate the large number of
claims that may be brought regarding employment discrimination and also
stress the importance of the administrative hearing. While the open-ended
nature of establishing an employment discrimination claim under North
Carolina law is beneficial to plaintiffs like Gwendolyn Gordon, it does
present more complications and overlap in the analysis of discrimination
claims.
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